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Un1on - even durmg 11)51 tt,e southern 
area mmes and opencast mrnes continued 
to operate. Stnkes that have occurred have 
generally been confmed to one mrne and 
t most the m•nes withrn a part•cular area 
During the course of my research I have 
become even more convinced that the sys-
tem for the resolution of conflict evolved 1n 
the mmmg Industry could usefully be 
extended partiCUlarly to tndustnes where 
present mdustnal relat1ons are not what 
they shculd be If my hypothesis is correct 
the Government Employers Federation 
Ftderat1on of Labour And the Labour 
Department could usefully explore the pos-
Sibilttles of 1m~ cmentmg 1ke procedures. • 
NEGOTIATING WITH THE JAPANESE 
• ALAN GLOGOSKI 
INTRODUCTION 
Many characteristiCS of Japanese society and institutions are 
absolutely unique These must be recognized and understood if an effective 
dialogue w1th the Japanese is to be ach1eved 
Trad1t1onal Japanese values are not derived from or even Influenced 
to any s1gnif1cant degree by Judeo-Christ1an traditions or beliefs. Many 
things that are taken for granted in the West are therefore completely 
aliE-n to their culture and are outside their traditional system 
I would like to touch on some important aspects of the traditional 
Japanese culture. soc1ety, nallonal character and political system, and how 
these influence their negotiating habits 
COMMUNAL 
In nearly .:t.l SC!IVIIIBS and ISSUBS the 
Japanese tradrllonally thtnl.; of themselves 
as members of a oroup and the•r satlsfac-
l•ons are largely expected to come through 
g cup fulf•llment of group obtect•ves In 
trad•t•onar Japanese culture and to an 
cmaz1ng degree today one of the worst sms 
IS IO diSplay llO BQOISIIC diSregard Of. di!;· 
1nterest tn 1''lr res1stance to group mores. 
attitudes. taboos trad1!1ons or ObJeCtives-
(. r often JUS! to dtsplay any 1nd1vidual1sm 
et all 
Japan 15 probably the only large country 
m the world tr wh1ch evcrvbody concerned 
management labour consumers. fam1ly. 
the general publ1c - tends to Jdent1fy the 
success of a bu~mess firm w1th the suc· 
cess of the nat1on and w1th his own indi· 
vtdual succes The f~rm s tnumph IS the 
nation·s tnumph and also hts own tnumph 
Thts ~hows up 1n fore1gn trade where the 
Jap.1ne e co· perate to a remarkable 
degree even wh1le compct1ng Wh1lst the 
Japanese exportPr tries best for h1s own 
flfm he takes almost as much pleasure 10 
any Japanese export success 
Robert Huntingdon I comments I that the 
Japanese personality has weak, Jnd1st1nct 
permeable boundanes between the self and 
other IS dependent rather than Independ-
ent group co-operatlv& rather than self 
rel1ant conform1ng rather than mnovattve 
and acceptmg of personal rather than 
rat1onat legal 1uthority I 
Ideal types of character are an Import-
ant lndtcatlon of a nat1on s cul!ure Prob-
ably to a degree unmatched tn any other 
culture the J.tpanese have exalted such 
qual1ttes as loyalty faithfulness. devotion 
ded1cat1on etc as assoctated w1th the fallh-
ful serv1tor on the one hand - and the 
correspond1ng quahttes of loyalty protec-
tiOn. meticulous regard for ntuat. codes 
obhgattons etc appropnate to the respon-
Sibl.a paternal! t1 Conluc1 !n m ~ster on the 
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other This is presumably one of the rea-
sons a Japanese factory works so well 
It IS also of course a mator source of the 
unsurpassed ability of the Japanese at 
purposive, communal action 
NATIONALLY EGOISTIC AND 
HIERARCHICAL 
The Japanese people have almost always 
had a very clear conception of themselves 
as be1ng special as being Japanese and 
therefore unique. 
According to Ruth Benedict2 " The Japan-
ese character is in large measure the 
product of explic1t traimng 1n the need for 
self sacrificing pursuit of duty - of duty 
towards the nat1on. the company, the fam1ly 
status, superiors and personal benefactors, 
and of the duty to maintam ones good 
narrm 1n order to retam the esteem of ones 
group - a preoccupation which has made 
shame rather than guilt the maJor moral 
sanction." 
The Japanese also have very little con-
cept of equality Traditionally every Japan-
ese is part of a hierarchical structure 
There are people who rank above every 
individual except the Emperor and, except 
for the youngest daughter of a member of 
the outcast burakus, there are people be-
neath. To say 1n Japan that certain people 
are equal generally Implies that they are 
an equal distance from some common 
supenor 
The Japanese do not thmk of themselves 
as being racist. However 1n some ways 
Japan IS the most racist nation in the world 
The Japanese 1n comparison w1th most 
other groups are relatively pure racially 
There are, so to speak, no blond, red ha~red 
or blue eyed Japanese and the attitude of 
the Japanese towards m1xed marriage IS 
very different to that of say the Chinese 
or French . If somebody 1s born of a mixed 
marriage in China or France but grows up 
perfeclly familiar wilh and skilled 1n the 
ind1genous culture he 1s largely accepted 
That IS not true in Japan. The children of 
mixed marriages are more or less perman-
ently barred from partic1patmg fully and 
comfortably 1n soc1ety. Those bars also 
hold against children born 1n Japan but 
of Korean or Chinese parentage 
An Important consequence of th1s is that 
the Japanese are unw11tmg to import inex-
pens1ve labour into their country It also 
Implies that when they go to other coun-
tnes to exploit the inexpensive labour there 
they do 11 with very little Intermarriage and 
perhaps w1thout easy social intercourse. 
EMPHASIS OF THE SPIRITUAL AND 
APPARENT OVER THE MATERIAL 
AND REAL 
Th1s aspect takes a number of different 
forms. In looking at the duality of the poli-
tics of Japan, for example, one notices tr'"' 
there have generally been people whom we 
would call "front men, " their behaviour is 
honourable and exemplary, and it is always 
in accord with valued principles and tradi-
tions: 11 1s to them that respect and loyalty 
are due. Then there are others behind the 
scenes who manipulate the system and are 
olten very practical and pragmatic; but 
they are considered unworthy even of dis-
cussion. Indeed 1n many cases the Japan-
ese seem to w1sh to take the apparent as 
more important than the real. At least as 
far as discussion of issues is concerned, 
the Japanese often demonstrate an un-
willingness to come to gnps with s1mple 
facts, preferring mstead a discussion of 
the higher moral 1ssues - sometimes in a 
way that a Westerner would JUdge to be an 
outright denial of reality 
The Japanese, who are endowed with a 
highly developed aesthetic sense, tend to 
be better at feeling things than analysing 
them Th1s makes them remarkably casual 
about wntten documents Where we 1n 
cases of dispute tend to say " Let us return 
to the anginal document or contract and 
see what it said,·· many Japanese would 
not think the matter of sufficient Import-
ance to be mentioned. For most Japanese 
the critical issue is the present and past 
emot1onal background of a relationship, 
the personal 1ssues and attributes that led 
to 1ts creation and the current power or 
bargain1ng Situation 
The Japanese would want to know· what 
was the ambience of the situation in which 
the document was signed, what events 
have occurred since the signing and what 
are the current relationships of the con-
cerned parties? - all things are a1e usu-
ally irrelevant to a European involved in a 
d1spute over a contractual issue. A very 
good textbook on Japan. for example, des-
cribed this characteristic Japanese attitude 
as follows . 
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Japanese businessmen avoid preced-
ent and deprecate legal, contractual 
obligations because they believe an 
agreement valid only so long as the 
cond1ttons under whtch 11 was reached 
conttnue to hold true. They view con-
tracts Wllh suspiCIOn and draw them 
up Wtlh an eye to flextbility, in con-
trast to the Amencan pract1ce of try-
tng to close every concetvable loop-
hole. Few dtsputes between Japanese 
bus1nesses ever go to court because 
th1s would be an admission that they 
have not been able to negottate a 
compromtse Courts operate on the 
same theory and endeavour to medi-
ate a compromise if a dispute comes 
to them 1n desperation. Courts are 
deliberately slow. not only because 
care IS reqUired but because the 
longer a court holds off. the better 
t.1e chance the two part1es will be 
forced to compromise 
A Westerner entenng into a 
contract wtth a Japanese tndtvtdual 
or ftrm Will fmd that a contract is 
often cons1dered an agreement to 
enter 1nto a general course of conduct 
rather than something fixing the pre-
else terms of performance. As a re-
sult, there may be basic disagree-
ment over whether or not the agree-
ment has been breached 
Much the same approach mentioned 
here wtth regard to business relationships 
also holds for treattes and other inter-
nattonal agreements and understandings. If 
there IS a change 1n power or other relation-
Ships but new emottonar relattonshtps have 
not been built up, then no treaty is likely 
to have serious moral bindtng effect on the 
Japanese 
It should be noted however that there 
now seems to be a dectded trend among 
younger Japanese mtellectuals to be prag-
rnattc, maller of fact, detached and coot-
in contrast to the traditional pattern which 
can only be categorized as dogmattc, 
moralistic. Ideological and more interested 
1n appearance than m realrty and actuality 
THE POLITICS AND TECHNIQUES OF 
GROUP CENTERED DECISION 
MAKING 
The Japanese employ a diffuse group-
centred deciston making apparatus In 
th1s process the views of all parties who 
have an Interest tn the deciston are can-
vassed and an attempt 1s made to accom-
modate each of these v1ews. Otrect 
confror:tattons are avo1ded whenever pos-
Sible and many tnstttuttonal mechantsms, 
1ncludtng the use of middlemen, are 
employed to prevent them A diss1dent 
party may also be placated by grantmg him 
a concess1on on some issue totally unre-
lated to the decision at hand - or by 
concedmg an obligat1on to make up, when-
ever the opportunity occurs, any losses suf-
fered by a generous concession on the 
matter at 1ssue 
The Japanese system is reciprocal 
Everybody who has been generous 10 con-
cesston or who has done something out of 
the ordtnary to facilitate consensus is re-
membered. and to a remarkable degree he 
IS eventually repaid This is true if it is a 
matter of a favour a corporation has done 
'or the Government or a favour an 1ndiv1d-
unl has done for a corporation 
In most cases the dectston-maktng pro-
cess ts les~ simple than I have indicated 
Be1ng so diffuse, It ts dtff1cutt to isolate 
the source of the tnitiative behind an idea 
dn mtt1at1ve can come from almost anyone 
and often ongmates quite low in organiza-
tions. A s1m1lar diffiCUlty ex1sts in determin-
tng who 1s the effective decision-maker, 
smce the dectsion 1s tn a sense made by 
all the mterested parties each of whom has 
veto power Frequently the man with the 
sentor postllon tn an organization is not 
necessanly the one who wields eftecttve 
power or possesses the ability to satisfy 
diSSidents 
And though the Government has a voice 
m almost all mater busmess decisions and 
may itself assemble the views of various 
interested parties, it by no means exercises 
fmal dec1s1on-making power Even when 
the Government is Involved and has nom-
'nal authonty. an effort must be made to 
accommodate each viewpoint - including 
those cf tnterested private parttes 
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A Vtrtue of the Japanese system is that 
the eflort to keep all parties satis fied prac-
ttcally eliminates the demoralizing 
'squeaky-wheel" phenomenon But if 
some party or group remains - despite 
all discussions and compromise - oppos-
ed to a g1ven IOIItalive, the result IS usually 
a non-dectston - i.e. a deciston to stall 
and keep the question circulatmg mdefm-
tlely unttl the matter IS etther dropped or 
a change 1n conditions permits unanimous 
agreement. 
In some cases one group may ram 
through a decision against the wishes of 
a weaker opposition group, the Japanese 
characterize the resulting state as a 
"tyranny of the matority Thus to the 
Japanese act1on based on a ten to two 
vote does not represent a 'g roup decision ; 
it reflects instead the dommatton of a 
tyrranical matonty over the f~rmly held 
desires of the minority The proper out-
come should be some form of temporiZing 
'non-dec1sion.' 
One result of this technique is a thor-
ough dtscussion of the issues by aft who 
are affected and an equally thorough edu-
cational process. All mvolved parties recetve 
and contribute to this discussion of the 
options. facts, and phtlosophy behind a 
decision before that decision 1s finally 
made. Each party carefully prepares argu-
ments backing Its position and th1s infor-
mation is c~rculated. Thus once an accom-
modation is reached, the staff work has 
been completed and each party is aware of 
its role 1n executtng the dectsion. Typically 
the Japanese are prepared to move very 
quickly once an issue is resolved . 
One of the most mterestmg bureaucratic 
mamfestattons of the politics of consensus 
and the way it can be used or applied is 
through the institution of what is called 
"Ringi.' 
As th1s IS applied 1n Government bur-
eaucracies and large private bureaucracies, 
fUntor people '" a department achieve a 
consensus among themselves on an issue 
on whtch they lhtnk a decision should be 
made, and then they draft a paper on it. 
The department head will approve the 
paper Thts paper will then be circulated 
in other departments, usually at the lower 
l~vels. with much discussion and correction 
ensuing . The paper may go back and forth 
a number of times as changes are made, 
and eventually a reasonable consensus is 
achieved at the lower levels. The paper is 
then passed to the department heads and 
from there to the corporate heads, who now 
are under rather serious pressure to sign 
it and forward 11 to the mtnister/presidents 
office for fmal Implementation 
Thus Ringi is simply a special fnstltu-
llonal arrangement for obtaining the kind 
of consensus we have JUSt described, but 
one in whtch most of the inttiattve comes 
from the bottom or, mtddle levels 
The other main method of achtevmg 
agreement 1s called matoman' whtch can 
be part of the 'Rmgt' process or Independ-
ent of 11. The process is as follows 
A typical decision-making meet-
tng opens wtth a statement of the prob-
lem by the groups sen1or member Each 
member then exposes a sltght portion of 
his thinking , never coming out with a 
full-blown, thoroughly persuastve presen-
tation. After this, he sits back to listen 
to the same sort of exposition from the 
others. The Japanese, who has a tre-
mendously sensitive ego, does not wish 
to put htmself in a positton where he 1s 
holdmg a minonty or, worse, an isolated 
v1ew Nor does he wish to risk offendmg 
an assoc1ate by commg out bluntly with 
a proposal that might run contrary to his 
colleague's thoughts. The discussion goes 
on at great length, each person slowly 
and carefully presenting h1s opinion, 
gradually sensing out the feelings of 
other people, making a ptlch subtly fol-
lowmg it without pressing 1f he finds it 
acceptable. quietly backing off and ad-
fUSitng his views to those of the others 
1f he finds himself not in tune with 
the evolvmg consensus. When the leader 
of the group believes that all are 
1n basic agreement wtth a minimally 
acceptable decision, he sums up the 
thtnking of the group. asks whether all 
are agreed, and looks around to receive 
their consenting nods. Nothing is cram-
med down anyone's throat. If, by chance, 
a consensus does not emerge and a 
deadlock seems likely, the group leader 
does not press for a dectsion, does not 
ask for a vote, does not rule that no 
consensus seems possible and thus em-
barrass people Instead, he suggests that 
perhaps more time is needed to think 
about the problem, and sets a date for 
another meeting. The people involved can 
then meet informally to adjust views or. 
1f there are positions that are apart, 
medtators wtll go back and forth between 
the people holding the opposing positions 
and attempt to narrow down the differ-
ences. By the time the next meeting is 
called, the differences most likely will 
have been straightened out and the pro-
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cess can be moved forward to a final 
dec1s1on. In all of th1s. the most Import-
ant pnnc1ple is not to stand on pnnc1ple 
but to reach agreement. All else 15 
subordmate to th1s potnt" 
AFFECTING JAPANESE DECISION 
MAKING FROM THE OUTSIDE 
It must be real1zed that th1s process or 
group centred dectsion making· IS a rela-
ttvely autonomous one. at least as far as 
outsiders are concerned, and can more 
easily be affected negatively than positively 
That 1s, any pressures to accelerate it or 
make it reach an Immediate decision are 
likely to be regarded with 1ntense hostility 
and suspicion 
But that is not to say that foreigners 
have not been able to influence decisions 
It an outs1der can anticipate the eventual 
form of the consensus to emerge and can 
art1culate It at the appropriate moment, he 
may perform a valuable serv1ce to the 
Japanese d1scuss•on And somet1mes an 
outsider has an advantageous perspective 
for attempting to do exactly that It is 
however particularly important that such 
an outside solution be advanced in ltme 
to 1nfluence the discussion and before the 
chief negot1ator - or an Important group 
- has adopted positions that are more or 
less contrary to the outsiders proposed 
consensus 
In any case 11 is clear that the outsider 
could go to some patns to provide the 
Japanese discussants with relevant inform-
ation and to explain the reasons for his 
own preferences. He should not wait until 
the consensus has been largely achieved 
before JOining the dtscussion. nor should 
he expect tmmediate results. {He cannot 
poss1bly convrnce the individuals he Is 
talking to. as they represent a larger com-
munal constituency. which must be con-
sulted). Therefore to the extent that the 
outsider has relevant and important infor-
mation. tdeas. concepts, arguments, etc., 
he should attempt to get them in as early 
as POSStble 
For many issues on which such deCIS-
IOns are betng made, there are out-groups 
not directly consulted, at least 1n the parti-
cular 'game. In the political arena these 
might 1nclude newspapers, intellectuals, 
students. workers. radtcals, the opposJiton 
political parttes. and so on. In any parti· 
cu/ar context there will be some such out-
groups of varytng degrees of Importance 
They can sometimes influence both the 
content and t1m1ng of the decision by 
threaten1ng to precipitate a confrontatron 
before the accommodatron process has had 
suff1cient time to work. In particular, they 
can exert enormous delaying influence. 
srnce it rs extremely difficult, if not Im-
possible, for even a pronounced marority 
to ram through legislative or adm1nstrattve 
decisrons against the will of a determined 
minonty, for, as indicated earlier, to do so 
would be thought of by most Japanese as 
a ·tyrranny of the marority' 
It follows therefore, that an outs1de busi-
ness firm, government bureau or other 
organization should not normally try to 
rush the decision process, because to do 
so will often only result tn the erection of 
bamers and animosity. Instead one should 
find out where the staff work on a problem 
1s being done, provide the staff with rele-
vant mformalton, and present opinions -
mostly when the Japanese ask for them. 
S1nce the Japanese do Intensive staff work 
to educate themselves, any effort to rush 
or channel thrs process is likely to raise 
susp1c10ns of deception Unsolicited opin-
ions should be presented only as the pro-
cess goes on. In particular one should not 
take a rigid pos1t1on: otherwise the Japan-
ese might become frustrated and give up 
any hope of accommodatron Also one 
m1ght take a lesson from the Japanese and 
occasionally propose side deals or suggest 
other means of accommodation to make it 
easter for the Japanese to move appre-
Ciably 1n the desired direction And since 
decisions are reached only after an extend-
ed period of discuss1on among the large 
number of Interested Japanese parties who 
often hold widely divergent views. anyone 
antrc1pating the eventual agreement and 
articulating 11 at the right moment may not 
only facilitate but sometimes influence the 
decision 
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The part1cular charactenstics of Japan-
ese society and Institutions discussed here 
are by no means presented as curiosities or 
m1nor items of information. They are im-
portant to an understanding of the mech-
aniSms by wh1ch a decision will be made, 
or avoided, and the conditrons under which 
tt will be Implemented A Westerner 
fl 
attempting to shortcut an understanding of 
or a sensitivity to these special character-
IStiCS IS likely to be in for a rude shock in 
h1s dealings with the Japanese. Attempts 
at salesmanship with the finest and most 
persuasive of Western presentations are 
quite likely to fall. Negotiations in any area 
can become Impossible. Yet generally the 
Westerner w1ll have done his best, w1ll hav~ 
rece1ved a warm reception, and will have 
no 1dea why his plans have made no pro-
gress. \! 
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